Earlier this month, the Cyberlaw Clinic filed an amicus brief before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (“SJC”) in Commonwealth v. Arias (SJC-13816). The Clinic represented Professor Mailyn Fidler and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”). The brief supports defendant-appellant Jose Arias, who objects to the use of a traffic infraction that occurred over twenty-four hours earlier as pretext for a later investigatory traffic stop. Amici call the Court’s attention to the risk of allowing such a delay, especially considering the current state of traffic surveillance technology. The combination of allowing delayed, pretextual traffic stops along with the current pervasive state of surveillance would give police unconstitutionally broad discretion to conduct suspicionless stops of drivers.
Mr. Arias caught the attention of a Boston police drug unit on patrol. A patrolling officer followed Mr. Arias in an unmarked police car for six miles, until Mr. Arias committed a traffic infraction. Citing safety concerns, the officer did not conduct a stop at the scene, nor did he radio a marked car to conduct a stop, as was traditionally-accepted practice. Instead, a full day later, the same officer tailed Mr. Arias and radioed for a marked car to perform a stop “for a drug investigation,” using the prior day’s infraction as the basis for the stop. Mr. Arias moved to suppress drug evidence obtained during that stop, in part, because the twenty-four hour delay in enforcement was unconstitutional. The trial court disagreed, and Mr. Arias appealed to the SJC. The SJC solicited amicus briefs about a number of arguments preserved for appeal, including whether the delay in initiating the traffic stop rendered the stop unreasonable per Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342 (2022).
In the brief, amici argue that permitting significantly delayed, pretextual traffic stops creates a concerning precedent, particularly when combined with the current state of police surveillance technology. Specifically, integrated systems of always-on, AI-powered surveillance, such as Flock Safety, ensure that police have greatly expanded detection capabilities for traffic infractions, far in excess of their capacity to conduct stops. With the breadth of the traffic code and the pervasiveness of the surveillance network, this ensures that almost any given motorist may have evidence of an infraction detected and logged in a police database. Accordingly, amici argue two main points against the rule. First, it would give police enormous discretion as to which of these numerous logged infractions to pursue via a traffic stop. Such discretion could be abused, allowing officers to make enforcement decisions based on protected characteristics like race. Second, and perhaps more concerning, is that it would give police the power to conduct traffic stops without an articulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Because Massachusetts has an objective test for traffic stop authorization, police could bootstrap a stop for an unrelated purpose by setting up an alert for infractions committed by a specific driver, sit back, and wait. This power would amount to a general warrant, and a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment and Massachusetts’ Article 14.
Fall 2025 Cyberlaw Clinic students Alex Peile, Jenny Guzdial and Juvaria Shahid worked on the brief alongside Professor Fidler and attorneys from EPIC. The students were supervised by Clinical Instructors Mason Kortz and Michael Rosenbloom. The Clinic looks forward to the SJC’s decision in this case.